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22 May 1965
Draft
DDI:PAB

INTELLIGENCE PLANNING FOR
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE


I. Organizational Purpose

The course of recent history, the actions of four Presidents, and prospective international developments all point inescapably to a continuing key role for the Director of Intelligence in our Government.

As the President's principal intelligence officer, the DCI, necessarily supported by the Central Intelligence Agency, will, in peace or war, be called upon to serve variously as advisor to the highest councils, as evaluator of their foreign informational needs, and as manager of the national security activities entrusted to his care.

By performing them himself, or by superintending their performance by other departments of Government, the DCI is responsible for the full range of foreign intelligence and related activities upon which our national well-being and even our survival may depend. These include the production of national intelligence, the performance centrally of

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intelligence and counterintelligence services of common concern, covert action, and, by extension, related activities in the newer realms

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II. Planning Objective

The fundamental objective of our planning is to improve the support given to the President and policy makers at the highest level in the field of national security.

The pursuit of this objective requires that the affairs of the Intelligence Community be conducted ~~more~~ effectively and efficiently through a ~~more~~ rational allocation of responsibilities and the development of ~~more~~ meaningful relations among Government components having intelligence responsibilities.

This includes improving the performance of the Agency itself through a more precise definition of its responsibilities and by establishing over-all guidance for strengthened programs which clearly put first things first to the exclusion of marginal programs.

III. Planning Cycle

There shall be two intelligence plans, an intermediate plan and a long-range plan. The intermediate shall be a 5-year projection; the long-range a 10-year extension beyond

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the 5-year plan. Both plans will be reviewed annually and revised as required, it being generally understood that whereas the 5-year plan will usually require annual revision, the 10-year plan may well stand for 2 or 3 years without major change.

Comment: This approach facilitates planning by making the 5-year plan an integral part of our present 5-year budget projection exercise, invariably based on assumptions that things won't change appreciably over any immediately 5-year period ahead. On the other hand, a look into any period 5 to 15 years ahead calls for different assumptions and for generalizations in programming neither desirable nor necessary in a short range plan. To put the two together would unnecessarily further complicate a matter already bound to be complicated by reason of the scope and diversity of activities being planned.

IV. Planning Assumptions

Comment: Herein include assumptions, amended through coordination, having to do with the major issues of national security along lines of those listed on pp. 2 and 3 of Clarke document with minimal necessary

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lead-in from Kent 20 May document. In the alternative, the form of this section might be closer to Kent's 18 May approach. In any event, we should not consider as assumptions items such as are found under the Guide to Forecasting list.

V. Identified Problem Areas and Proposed Action

Comment: Herein include such matters as are listed in the Guide to Forecasting. These would in fact be a summary and systematic grouping of the problem statements selected from those submitted by the grass roots in response to a call down to perhaps the branch or division level.

To facilitate action assignments and tie-in with office budgets once plan has been approved, problems should be grouped as follows:

- A. Of interagency nature
- B. Within CIA
 - (1) Agency as whole
 - (2) DDI
 - (3) DDS&T
 - (4) DDP
 - (5) DDS
- C. Other departmental

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VI. Budgetary Implications

Herein or at annex would be consolidated, by office budgets, the impact of attempts to implement actions proposed in V. above.

Attachment: Proposed guidance for soliciting basic contributions to the intelligence planning.

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**FORM OF BASIC CONTRIBUTIONS
TO INTELLIGENCE PLANNING**

Statement of problem

[Being a description of a significant problem or reference to a problem area; e.g., the imbalance between a present or projected collection program and the provisions made for the processing and exploitation of the take.]

Proposed action

[Your ideas of what can be attempted or done about the problem, and by whom.]

Budgetary implications

[To extent possible indicate T/O and \$ requirements.]

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